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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Arbeidsnotat No. 2000/1
Verlag: 
Norges Bank, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
International comparisons show that countries with co-ordinated wage setting generally have lower unemployment than countries with less co-ordinated wage setting. This paper argues that the monetary regime may affect whether co-ordination among many wage setters is feasible. A strict monetary regime, like a country-specific inflation target, to some extent disciplines wage setters, so that the consequences of uncoordinated wage setting are less detrimental than under a more passive monetary regime (eg a monetary union). Thus, the gains from co-ordination are larger under a passive regime. Under some circumstances a passive regime may induce co-operation in wage setting, and thus lower unemployment, when a stricter regime would not.
Schlagwörter: 
wage setting
co-ordination
equilibrium unemployment
monetary regime
monetary union
JEL: 
E24
J5
E52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
82-7553-157-8
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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