Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214345 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2005-31
Verlag: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy for discouraging terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for the government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any cultural monuments destroyed discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists' expectations and by increasing the government's reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.
Schlagwörter: 
Terrorism
Culture
Monuments
Counter-terrorism
Deterrence
JEL: 
D74
H56
Z10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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