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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 1-12
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage. Given the second-stage optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS) of talent investment, it was shown that teams may choose a mix of profit or win maximization as their objective, where the former is of considerably higher relevance with linear weights for profits, and is more successful in the utility function. With linear weights for profit and win maximization, maximizing profits is the only evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of teams. The results change if quadratic weights for profits and wins are employed. With increasing talent productivity, win maximization dominates in the static and in the dynamic versions of the model. As a consequence, it is an open question whether the commercialization of football (and other sports) leagues will lead to more profit or win maximization.
Schlagwörter: 
indirect evolution
football leagues
utility maximization
profit maximization
evolutionary stability
JEL: 
C71
D62
Q53
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