Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/223303 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Verlag: 
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Macroprudential regulators worldwide have introduced regulations to limit household leverage in light of existing evidence which suggests that high leverage is associated with household distress during crisis. We analyse the distributional effects of such a macroprudential policy on mortgage and house price cycles. For identification, we exploit the universe of UK mortgages and a 15%-limit imposed in 2014 on lenders — not households — for high loan-to-income ratio (LTI) mortgages. Despite some regulatory arbitrage (eg increases in LTV and average loan size), more-constrained lenders issue fewer high-LTI mortgages. Partial substitution by less-constrained lenders leads to overall credit contraction to low-income borrowers in local-areas more exposed to constrained-lenders, lowering house price growth. Following the Brexit referendum (which led to house-price correction), the 2014-policy strongly implies — via lower pre-correction debt — better house prices and mortgage defaults during an episode of house price correction.
Schlagwörter: 
macrorpudential policy
mortgages
credit cycles
inequality
house prices
JEL: 
E5
G01
G21
G28
G51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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