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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13305
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates whether centralized admissions systems can alter school segregation. We take advantage of the largest school-admission reform implemented to date: Chile's SAS, which in 2016 replaced the country's decentralized system with a Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We exploit its incremental implementation and employ a Difference-in-Difference design. Using rich administrative student-level records, we find the effect of SAS critically depends on pre-existing levels of residential segregation and local school supply. For instance, districts with prominent provision of private education experience an uptick in school segregation due to SAS. Migration of high-SES students to private schools emerges as a key driver.
Schlagwörter: 
education
inequality
segregation
JEL: 
I20
I24
I28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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