Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224204 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 361
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
We characterize the equilibrium set of the n-player Hirshleifer contest with homogeneous valuations. A symmetric equilibrium always exists. It necessarily corresponds to multilateral peace for sufficient noise and uses finite-support randomized strategies otherwise. Asymmetric equilibria are feasible for nÏ3 contestants only, and only for sufficiently small noise. In pure strategies, any asymmetric equilibrium corresponds to one-sided dominance, but there is also a variety of payoff-inequivalent mixed-strategy equilibria for small noise. For arbitrarily small noise, at least two contestants engage in cut-throat competition, while any others become ultimately inactive. Of some conceptual interest is the observation that, for n sufficiently large, the unique equilibrium is multilateral peace.
Subjects: 
Hirshleifer contest
Nash equilibrium
rent dissipation
difference-form contest
all-pay auction
JEL: 
C72
D72
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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