Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230565 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1412
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. We explore such considerations by extending the threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute to an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. We experimentally study the effects of the intermediary on contributions and successful public good funding. Results show that delegation increases overall contributions and public good success, but only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct funding received from donors to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary is detrimental, resulting in lower contributions, a higher probability of miscoordination, and lower payoffs.
Schlagwörter: 
Delegation
threshold public goods
laboratory experiment
fundraising
JEL: 
C91
C92
H40
H41
L31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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