Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/231414 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 21-024
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We conduct a field experiment with sellers of home-improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market which allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting.
Schlagwörter: 
Collaborative tax evasion
evasion discount
undeclared work
third-party reporting
field experiment
JEL: 
H26
C93
E26
J22
O17
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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