Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/231429 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 336
Version Description: 
Revised version, February 2021
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M Ï N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M È N, full-support type distributions, and network games.
Subjects: 
Colonel Blotto games
private information
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
generalized Dirichlet distributions
networks
Netzwerk
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Ressourcenallokation
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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