Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232447 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8850
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and receivers’ interests are not in conflict. We obtain this even though, as in previous literature, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. We argue our findings could be attributed to distributional preferences of senders who lie to avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than herself.
Subjects: 
experiments
cheap talk
deception
conflicts of interest
social preferences
JEL: 
D83
C72
G14
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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