Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234915 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1103
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a particular form of pooling: there is a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they choose actions that are clustered in possibly non-monotonic ways, with a gap separating these two sets of types. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction under mild conditions.
Subjects: 
single-crossing property
double-crossing property
counter-signaling
pairwise pooling
mass pooling
JEL: 
D82
I21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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