Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235007 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 684
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner's dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we find that the effect increases with social proximity among participants.
Schlagwörter: 
common pool resource
collective action
social norms
lab-in-the-field experiment
JEL: 
C72
C93
D7
Q22
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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