Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/236273 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14242
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of the donation to be made. An up to 20 % donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20 % of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 % and 20 %. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. Voting in favor of a 20 % donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment has positive effects on contributions to the public good compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.
Schlagwörter: 
donations
decision right
public good game
team incentives
laboratory experiment
charitable giving
JEL: 
C72
C92
D64
D70
J33
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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