Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/238223 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2019-20
Publisher: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Abstract: 
Status and reputation concerns are conjectured to be important especially in markets with information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, such as in credence goods markets. To investigate the effects of status and reputation on reciprocal behavior of sales personnel in a financial credence goods market, we run a natural field experiment. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking for an appointment. We find that status nudging and, with a larger effect size, reputation nudging in the e-mails increase brokers' response rates compared to a neutral request. Both effects are robust across all responses, only counting affirmative responses, and in urban and rural areas.
Subjects: 
Insurance brokers
natural field experiment
credence goods
status
reputation
JEL: 
C93
G41
G22
D12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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