Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240060 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Administrative Sciences [ISSN:] 2076-3387 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-32
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In this paper we build a pragmatic model on competition in oligopoly markets. To achieve this goal, we use an approach based on studying the response functions of each market participant, thus making it possible to address both Cournot and Bertrand industrial structures with a unified formal method. In contrast to the restrictive theoretical constructs of duopoly equilibrium, our study is able to account for real-world limitations like minimal sustainable production levels and exclusive access to certain resources. We prove and demonstrate that by using carefully constructed response functions it is possible to build and calibrate a model that reflects different competitive strategies used in extremely concentrated markets. The response functions approach makes it also possible to take into consideration different barriers to entry. By fitting to the response functions rather than the profit maximization of the payoff functions problem we alter the classical optimization problem to a problem of coupled fixed points, which has the benefit that considering corner optimum, corner equilibria and convexity condition of the payoff function can be skipped.
Subjects: 
duopoly equilibrium
entry barriers
imperfect competition
response functions
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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