Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240692 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers No. 2020-03
Publisher: 
Banco de México, Ciudad de México
Abstract: 
In this paper, we establish sufficient conditions on the domain of preferences and agents' behavior in order to characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings depends on what agents believe other agents will do if they deviate. Such sets of reactions are called estimation functions or simply estimations. We show that, unless some restrictions would be imposed on agents' preferences, there is no constraint on agents' behavior that assures the existence of stable matchings. In addition, we introduce a condition on preferences called bottom q-substitutability that guarantees the existence of at least one stable matching when the set of estimations includes all possible matches. Finally, we analyze a notion of the core and its relation with the set of stable assignments.
Subjects: 
Two-sided matching: Externalities
Stability
Estimation functions
Pessimistic agents
Core
JEL: 
C71
C78
D62
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
389.19 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.