Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242415 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
Online interactions are frequently governed by reputation systems that allow users to evaluate each other after an interaction. Effective reputation systems can increase trust and may improve efficiency in market settings. In recent years, however, fake reviews have become increasingly prevalent. Since it is difficult to clearly identify fake reviews in field studies, we design a lab10 oratory experiment. Using a repeated public good game with a reputation system, we study (i) how feedback manipulation influences the reliability of average ratings and (ii) whether the existence of manipulated ratings reduces efficiency. We find that feedback manipulation generally decreases the reliability of average ratings in comparison to a control treatment where cheating is not possible. When manipulation is possible and free, average ratings become less 15 reliable, expectations are lower and both cooperation and efficiency are significantly reduced. When there are costs of manipulation, however, average ratings are more reliable and contributions and efficiency are not impaired. Interestingly, this is the case even when costs of manipulation are comparatively low.
Subjects: 
Reputation Systems
Fake Reviews
Reliability of Ratings
Efficiency
JEL: 
C72
C91
D83
L14
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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