Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242860 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 21-09
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
This article provides a tractable model of inter-temporal price-discrimination by heterogeneous firms, imperative for our understanding of advance purchase markets in the wake of entry. The pricing schedule of a more efficient entrant is found to differ systematically from the pricing schedule of a more prominent incumbent. By diverting competition to a stage where consumers face uncertainty about their preferences, advance selling reduces prices while increasing the entrant's market share and profitability relative to the incumbent. Policies that curtail the firms' ability to sell in advance, although potentially beneficial for welfare, may have the adverse effects of consolidating an incumbent's position and of reducing the consumers' surplus.
Schlagwörter: 
Competition
Price Discrimination
Individual Demand Uncertainty
Advance Purchase Discounts
JEL: 
D43
D80
L13
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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