Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248948 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9403
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Worldwide, the overwhelming majority of large horizontal mergers are cleared by antitrust authorities unconditionally. The presumption seems to be that efficiencies from these mergers are sizeable. We calculate the compensating efficiencies that would prevent a merger from harming consumers for 1,014 mergers affecting 12,325 antitrust markets scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2018. Compensating efficiencies seem too large to be achievable for many mergers. Barriers to entry and the number of firms active in the market are the most important factors determining their size. We highlight concerns about the Commission’s merger enforcement being too lax.
Subjects: 
compensating efficiencies
efficiency gains
merger control
concentration
screens
HHI
mergers
unilateral effects
market definition
entry barriers
JEL: 
L19
L24
L00
K21
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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