Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248949 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9404
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest as a means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment doubles cooperation rates in comparison to a control condition. Children also reciprocate others’ behavior, yet direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase overall cooperation rates. We also examine the influence of children’s cognitive skills and parents’ socioeconomic background on cooperation.
Subjects: 
cooperation
reciprocity
third-party punishment
reputation
children
parents
cognitive abilities
socioeconomic status
prisoner’s dilemma game
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C93
D01
D91
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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