Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/250504 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14843
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Adam Smith alleged that secret employer collusion to reduce labor earnings is common. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: no-poach agreements through which technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. Estimates indicate each agreement cost affected workers approximately 2.5 percent of annual salary. Stock bonuses and ratings of job satisfaction were also negatively affected.
Subjects: 
monopsony
oligopsony
employer market power
labor earnings
JEL: 
J42
K21
J30
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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