Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256772 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 305
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We model firms' quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently skeptical about undisclosed quality. We show that cursed consumers are exploited in duopoly markets if firms are vertically differentiated, if there are few cursed consumers, and if average product quality is high. Three common consumer protection policies that work under monopoly, i.e. mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education, may all increase exploitation and decrease welfare. Even where these policies improve overall welfare, they often lead to a reduction in consumer surplus. We show that our conclusions hold in extensions with endogenous quality choice and horizontal differentiation.
Subjects: 
naive
cursed
disclosure
consumer protection
labeling
competition
JEL: 
C72
D03
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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