Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257455 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 37 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-8
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We show that even if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is still possible through technology licensing. However, unlike the case of a cost-free honest outside agency, where information transmission always occurs under a quantity setting oligopoly, information transmission through licensing does not always occur.
Subjects: 
asymmetric information
information transmission
licensing
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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