Decisions on extending group membership: Evidence from a public good experiment

Grund, Christian; Harbring, Christine; Thommes, Kirsten; Tilkes, Katja Rebecca

doi:doi:10.3390/g11040061

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257479

Title:

Decisions on extending group membership: Evidence from a public good experiment

Authors:

Grund, Christian
Harbring, Christine
Thommes, Kirsten
Tilkes, Katja Rebecca

Year of Publication:

2020

Citation:

[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 61 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-27

Publisher:

MDPI, Basel

Abstract:

We experimentally compare the consequences for group cooperation of two decision mechanisms involving the extension of group membership. We analyze an exogenous decision (random draw) and an endogenous decision (made by a particular group member) mechanism to extend a temporary agent's group membership. Our results reveal that the prospect of group membership extension affects not only the temporary but also the permanent group members' contributions with an endogenous mechanism.

Subjects:

cooperation
experiment
group membership
public good game

Persistent Identifier of the first edition:

doi:10.3390/g11040061

Creative Commons License: