Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257495 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 13 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-18
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
For 1990-2019, this study presents two-step GMM estimates of EU members' demands for defense spending based on alternative spatial-weight matrices. In particular, EU spatial connectivity is tied to EU membership status, members' contiguity, contiguity and power projection, inverse distance, and arms trade. At a Nash equilibrium, our EU demand equations are derived explicitly from a spatially based game-theoretical model of alliances. Myriad spatial linkages among EU members provide a robust free-riding finding, which differs from the spatial and non-spatial literature on EU defense spending. Even though the EU applies common trade policies and allows for unrestricted labor movement among members, members' defense responses adhered to those of a defense alliance. Moreover, EU defense spending exhibits positive responses to GDP and transnational terrorist attacks, and a negative response to population. During the sample period, EU members did not view Russia as a military threat.
Schlagwörter: 
alliance
European Union (EU)
Nash equilibrium
spatial autoregression and connectivity
strategic free riding
JEL: 
D74
H41
C21
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.