Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257837 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Financial Studies [ISSN:] 2227-7072 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 19 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-23
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In this study, we investigate whether effective corporate governance (CG) intervenes in the relationship between real earnings management (REM) and firm value (FV) by introducing Korean market data. We find that management's opportunistic REM behavior is no longer effective for firms characterized by strong CG. More importantly, our interaction and robustness analyses show evidence indicating that CG plays an effective monitoring role in preventing management from engaging in opportunistic REM activities, and FV ceases to experience the decrease associated with REM activities as a consequence.
Subjects: 
corporate governance
firm value
manager's opportunistic behavior
real earnings management
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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