Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259951 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2007:20
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
This paper extends the Grossman-Hart-Moore model to suite a specific trilateral trade transaction. In this transaction a downstream producer produces the final good using inputs from two different upstream suppliers. Moreover one of the upstream supplier needs an input from the other upstream supplier for its production. The optimal way to organize this transaction depend on the characteristics of assets, human capital and investments. The general finding is that it is more demanding to find a unique Pareto optimal organization in the trilateral model than in the bilateral Grossman-Hart-Moore model. This paper also produces a number of other potentially useful results.
Subjects: 
Trilateral Trade
Property Rights
Partial Integration
JEL: 
D23
L23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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