Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/263298 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1161
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the economy consisting of n agents and m heterogenous objects where the seller benefits v from objects. Our study focuses on the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). In the situation with arbitrary n, m and v, we show that the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices adjusted to v on the classical domain is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, strategy- proofness, individual rationality and no-subsidy. Our result is an extension of that of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), and so we can consider more general situation than them. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness and two-sided individual rationality.
Schlagwörter: 
Multi-object allocation problem
Strategy-proofness
Efficiency
Mini-mum price Walrasian rule
Non-quasi-linear preference
Heterogeneous objects
Reserveprices
JEL: 
D82
D47
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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