Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/263709 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9779
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether potential negative behavioral reactions to imposed control are larger when they are implemented by a direct superior rather than a hierarchically more distant superior. We find that hierarchical proximity indeed magnifies such control aversion and discuss several potential channels for this result.
Subjects: 
control aversion
hierarchies
delegation
principal-agent-problem
JEL: 
C92
D23
M12
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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