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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Policy Paper No. 182
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Adam Smith alleged that secret employer collusion to reduce labor earnings is common. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: no-poach agreements through which technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly random timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate that these agreements cost affected workers approximately 5 percent of annual salary. Stock bonuses and ratings of job satisfaction were also negatively affected.
Schlagwörter: 
monopsony
oligopsony
employer market power
labor earnings
JEL: 
J42
K21
J30
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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