Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266019 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9984
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We study a platformâs incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure faced by innovative products. However, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers. Furthermore, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which overturn the intended effect on innovation. Platform liability tends to increase (decrease) innovation and consumer welfare when the elasticity of participation of innovators is high (low) and that of buyers is low (high).
Subjects: 
platform
liability
intellectual property
innovation
JEL: 
K40
K42
K13
L13
L22
L86
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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