Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266554 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IWH Discussion Papers No. 6/2021
Versionsangabe: 
This version: 08.12.2022
Verlag: 
Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), Halle (Saale)
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide novel evidence that deposit competition incentivizes banks to securitize loans. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as an exogenous source of competition, we document a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize their assets. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in costs of deposits and a corresponding decrease in banks' deposit growth. Our results are strongest among small and single state incumbent banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight an unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.
Schlagwörter: 
competition
deposits
originate-to-distribute (OTD)
securitization
JEL: 
G21
G28
K11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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