Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267787 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1175
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offerbased Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power.
Subjects: 
Nash program
Bargaining procedures
Shapley value
Experiments
JEL: 
C70
C71
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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