Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267999 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. WP 2022-45
Publisher: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL
Abstract: 
In the US, workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of a past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part-time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. In a quantitative model, the monetary requirement induce workers to search longer because low paying jobs are not covered by UI. Since it mitigates moral hazard, the optimal UI design has a high monetary requirement.
Subjects: 
Unemployment Insurance
UI Eligibility
Optimal UI
JEL: 
E24
E61
J65
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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