Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268032 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 199
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent preferences that will determine the sender's optimal experiment, and give sufficient conditions for information design to be valuable or not under different payoff structures. These conditions depend more on marginal incentives-how payoffs vary with the state-than on the alignment of sender's and receiver's rankings over actions within a state.
Schlagwörter: 
marginal incentives
common interest
concave envelope
quasiconcave envelope
double randomization
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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