Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272508 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 15881
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice.
Subjects: 
relational contracts
informal enforcement
legal enforcement
incentives
private information
JEL: 
D21
D23
D82
D86
L14
L22
L23
L24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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