Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272555 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 15928
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Variation in assessor stringency in awarding benefits leaves applicants exposed to uninsured risk that could be systematic if discretion were exercised selectively. We test for this using administrative data on applications to the Dutch disability insurance program. We find that discretion is more often exercised in favor of lower-waged applicants. Pre-disability wages drop discontinuously just above disability thresholds for entitlement to partial benefits. Assessors are more likely to discard the highest-paying algorithm-generated job matches that determine earnings capacity and entitlement when evaluating lower-waged applicants. While these applicants benefit on average, they are exposed to greater risk from between assessor variation.
Subjects: 
disability insurance
screening
JEL: 
D73
H42
H55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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