Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/273718 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2023-204
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures envy-freeness. When priorities are merit-based, many spectators prefer the Boston mechanism, and this preference increases when priorities are determined by luck. At the same time, there is support for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns for envy-freeness rather than strategy-proofness, while support for the Boston mechanism stems from the belief that strategic choices create entitlements.
Subjects: 
markets
school choice
voting
Boston mechanism
sincere agents
justified envy
JEL: 
D47
C92
I24
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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