Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/277729 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 23-035
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
A key issue in strategic management in the public sector is how government creates economic and social value through procurement. Unfortunately, most procurement studies are based on contract theories, which fail to incorporate the growing role of strategic management in performance. We fill this gap by analyzing longitudinal data on contracting to assess the equity and efficiency effects of a form of affirmative action used by governments: set-aside programs. Employing a machine learning-augmented propensity score weighting approach, we find that set-aside contracts are negatively associated with contract performance. These effects are attenuated by an agency's dynamic capabilities and the extent to which the agency uses more competitive procedures. Our findings illustrate how the dynamic capabilities of a federal agency can simultaneously enhance equity and efficiency.
Schlagwörter: 
Dynamic capabilities
resource-based view
public procurement
machine learning
random forest
JEL: 
D73
H57
O38
L22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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