Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278295 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2214
Publisher: 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics, Linz
Abstract: 
We analyze self- and joint procurement of countries with heterogeneous demand for a good offered by a price discriminating monopolist. We find that not only countries with low but also with high demand can benefit from committing to jointly procure equal quantities at a uniform price, even if the supplier is capacity constrained. Free-riding of outside buyers as well as too much heterogeneity of insiders make the buyer group unstable. Uniform price procurement without a quantity restriction is only stable with intra-group transfers. We relate our findings to the COVID-19 vaccine procurement of the European Union.
Subjects: 
joint procurement
group purchase
heterogeneous buyer group
vaccineprocurement
price discrimination
JEL: 
C79
D42
L12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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