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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16283
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we find that: (i) managers make overconfident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly-positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomena are linked at an individual level. Our results are consistent with models of motivated beliefs in which individuals are motivated to distort memories of feedback and preserve unrealistic expectations.
Schlagwörter: 
overconfidence
memory
tournament
motivated beliefs
JEL: 
D82
D83
J33
L25
L81
M52
M54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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