Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279028 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16330
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We evaluate the impact of the Washington State Attorney General's enforcement campaign against employee no-poaching clauses in franchising contracts, which unfolded from 2018 through early 2020. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports, we document the nationwide effect of the enforcement campaign on pay at franchising chains across numerous industries. Our preferred specification estimates a 6.6% increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and an approximate 4% increase in worker-reported earnings.
Schlagwörter: 
employer market power
franchising
antitrust
oligopsony
JEL: 
J42
K21
L40
J31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.21 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.