Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279318 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10567
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
I model the ocean as an array of lines set within a two-dimensional frame, and show how the Exclusive Economic Zone emerged as an equilibrium in customary international law. I find that custom codifies the efficient Nash equilibrium of enclosure for nearshore fisheries. For highly migratory and offshore fisheries, enclosure is inefficient, and customary law supports a more efficient "free sea" regime. The model also identifies the trigger for changes in property rights and the reason choice of a particular limit, like the current 200-mile zone, is arbitrary. In an asymmetric, regional sea, I find that the scope of the EEZ is determined by the relative power of coastal and distant water states, and need not be efficient. Finally, I find that proposals to nationalize the seas or ban fishing on the high seas are neither efficient nor supportable as equilibria in customary law.
Subjects: 
customary international law
exclusive economic zone
ocean fisheries
closure of high seas
JEL: 
K33
F55
Q22
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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