Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279342 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10591
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This study investigates the effects of unfair enforcement of institutional rules on public good contributions, personal and social norms, and trust. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1,038), we find that biased institutions reduce rule compliance compared to fair institutions. However, rule enforcement – fair and unfair – reduces norm polarisation compared to no enforcement. We also find that social heterogeneity lowers average trust and induces ingroup favouritism in trust. Finally, we find consistent evidence of peer effects: higher levels of peer compliance raise future compliance and spillover positively into norms and trust. Our study contributes to the literature on behavioural responses to institutional design and strengthens the case for unbiased rule enforcement.
Subjects: 
public goods
compliance
social norms
trust
audits
biased rule enforcement
polarisation
JEL: 
H41
C72
C91
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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