Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279748 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series No. 76
Publisher: 
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg
Abstract: 
We bring attention to a previously overlooked determinant of de jure-de facto constitutional gaps: a polity's transition to a nation-state. We argue that nation-statehood, predicated on the formation of a strong sense of national identity, lowers the government's incentive to violate constitutional provisions. To test our theory, we use a recently released longitudinal database on constitutional compliance and exploit variation in the timing of countries' attainment of nation-statehood. Our empirical findings substantiate our hypothesis. Based on our preferred estimation approach, nation-statehood bolsters both overall constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance within the subdomains of basic rights, civil rights, and property rights & the rule of law. The estimated long-run effects of nation-statehood on constitutional compliance are considerable in size. Our analysis, thus, illuminates the foundational role of nation-statehood in fostering constitutional compliance.
Subjects: 
constitutional compliance
de jure-de facto gap
nation-state
national identity
statehood
JEL: 
D02
D72
K10
K42
P51
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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