Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282183 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 395
Version Description: 
Revised version, January 2024
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
We investigate the nature of social preferences when a decision maker's information is limited to group members' ordinal rankings. By studying choices made on behalf of others, we identify social choice rules that embody the normative values decision makers implicitly favor. Few people are attracted to majority or plurality rule as a normative principle. Most favor scoring rules that promote compromise. People evaluate relative sacrifice by inferring cardinal utility from ordinal ranks, but also care about ranks intrinsically. Cluster analysis reveals that our social preference classification is comprehensive. Ordinal aggregation principles are stable across domains and countries with divergent traditions.
Subjects: 
Experiment
welfare economics
social choice
Borda
Condorcet
JEL: 
C91
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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