Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282463 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10775
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Is work overload a friction to public agencies? Using data on R&D procurements, patents, and contracting units from a US federal agency, we investigate how officer workload impacts innovation procurement outcomes. Unanticipated retirement shifts provide an exogenous source of variation that we exploit as an instrument for workload. When workload declines, we find a significant increase in patent rates. One additional officer leads to a 28 percent increase in the probability that a contract will generate a patent. Our findings suggest that officers burdened with excessive workloads may not provide adequate guidance to R&D suppliers when it is most needed.
Subjects: 
workload
procurement
bureaucrats
R&D
patents
instrumental variable
JEL: 
D23
D73
H57
J24
O31
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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