Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282524 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10836
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We conducted a randomised controlled trial in Indonesia to evaluate the effect of three intervention letters on tax penalty compliance behaviour. Over 10,000 individual taxpayers are randomly assigned to receive either a deterrence, information, or simplification letter, or no letter. Our results indicate that simplification, which makes paying a penalty less burdensome administratively by providing billing codes to pay the penalties, yields the highest probability of timely settlement, increasing compliance by 32 per cent compared to the control group. Deterrence also positively impacts penalty compliance, increasing timely settlement rates by 27 per cent. The least effective intervention is the information letter. Although associated with a 12 per cent increase in tax compliance, this effect is only statistically significant at the 10 per cent confidence level. Our results suggest that strategic messaging by tax authorities in developing countries can be a cost-effective tool for improving tax penalty payment compliance.
Schlagwörter: 
tax penalties
tax compliance
RCT
simplification
deterrence
information
Indonesia
JEL: 
C93
D91
H26
Z18
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.