Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284321 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 971
Publisher: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Abstract: 
A Hard Problem is a collective choice problem in which the only feasible alternatives apart from the status quo consist of a welfare gain to some people (the Winners) and a welfare loss to the others (the Losers). These problems are typical in a number of settings, such as climate action, anti-trust regulation, and tax design. We study how to make collective choices when faced with Hard Problems. We find that requiring a relatively weak fairness condition, which we call Expansion Solidarity, necessarily leads to a dictatorship of the Losers, no matter how small their number. Even one single Loser must be given the power to veto any departure from the status quo, regardless of the number of Winners, how large the gains, or how small the loss.
Subjects: 
Pareto improvements
hard choices
solidarity
compromises
maximin difference
JEL: 
D63
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
693.03 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.