Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286388 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 687
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
Dynamic consistency is crucial for credible evaluation of intergenerational choice plans that inherently lack commitment. We offer a general characterization for dynamically consistent intergenerational welfare aggregation. The aggregation is characterized by envy-guilt asymmetry in discounting with respect to future generations' utility: Higher utility than future generations' utility is discounted differently than lower utility than future generations' utility. This offers a simple and tractable characterization for the dynamically consistent choice rules.
Subjects: 
Dynamic consistency
discounting
social discount factor
preference aggregation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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